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mAbstract
In northern Kenya, there have been limited discussions on the impacts of the 1960
to 1968 insurgency wars and subsequent banditry on the long-term impacts of the
pastoral economy. This is despite the societies’ vivid memories of the effects of these
wars, from which research would gain a long-term outlook about consequences on
rural economies. We present an understanding of the long-term impact of the shifta
(term used at that period by the Kenyan Government) for the secessionist war
fought by the Somali insurgents with the armed forces of Kenya between 1963 and
1968. We evaluate the impact of the shifta insurgency, the army's counter-insurgency
and the subsequent insecurity on the recovery of the pastoral economy between
1984 and 2007. We interviewed members of three communities in Isiolo District in
Kenya affected by the shifta war. The research shows that the livestock herds of the
communities have not achieved the levels of recovery of the pre-shifta war forty-four
years after that conflict ended. Persistent banditry and recurrent droughts are
blamed by the pastoralists for the lack of recovery of the pastoral herds of the three
communities. The article concludes that armed conflicts, coupled with risks of
droughts, have a long-term impact on the pastoral economy.
Keywords: Conflicts, Counter-insurgency, Insurgency, Horn of Africa, NFD, Pastoral
economic collapse, shifta, Waso BoranaIntroduction
Contemporary scholarship on pastoral conflicts in the Horn of Africa suggests that
raids and cattle rustlings have contributed to the demise of pastoralism (see Markakis
1993, 1998, 2010; McCabe 2004; Kaimba et al. 2011; Mkutu 2006, 2008). The drivers
of the conflicts have been identified as famine, poverty and issues of livestock wealth
redistribution (Hendrickson et al. 1996; Buchanan-Smith and Lind 2005), state policies
in general (Oba 1993), the politics of identity changes (Schlee and Watson 2009), com-
petition over scarce resources (Schilling et al. 2012) and regional political instability
(de Waal 1997; Hammond 1999; Brons 2001). Research on the long-term impact of
border wars, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies on the rural economy is however
lacking. Insurgency wars have geopolitical linkages, often transferring national and
international conflicts onto the local level, with a consequential destructive impact on
the rural economy (Miall 2004; Mburu 2005; Whittaker 2012) and population2013 Khalif and Oba; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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gency and the army's counter-insurgency wars on pastoral economies in the former
Northern Frontier District (NFD)1 of Kenya between 1963 and 1968, and we evaluate
the trends of the pastoral economy forty-four years later.
Soon after Kenya's independence in 1963, insurgency and counter-insurgency wars
broke out in the NFD with direct impacts on the pastoral populations and their econ-
omies (Whittaker 2012). This war was fought by the insurgents of the Northern Fron-
tier District Liberation Front, supported by the Somali Republic (Drysdale 1964; Mburu
2005), against Kenya's security forces. The warring parties targeted the pastoral econ-
omy for different reasons. The insurgency group raided herders to get access to food as
well as to punish those whom they suspected of opposing secession. The security forces
focused their attacks on the same pastoral groups for their alleged sympathy with and
practical support for the insurgency. The shifta2 war has remained vividly in the mem-
ories of local pastoralists, which, in the absence of written historical data, provides an
important basis for understanding the effects of insurgency and counter-insurgency
wars on a pastoral economy. Yet, we make no a priori assumption that the shifta war
alone was responsible for the collapse of the pastoral economy, but rather that it was a
major contributing factor.
Firstly, we briefly present the background of the insurgency war. The second aim is
to understand how members of some of the communities in which the insurgency took
place perceived the impact of the insurgency and counter-insurgency wars on their pas-
toral economy. The third aim is to evaluate official information on the impact of the in-
surgency and the army's counter-insurgency on the people and the economy of the Waso
Borana pastoralists. The fourth aim is to understand the long-term impact of the common
banditry and recurrent droughts on the recovery of the pastoral economy. We begin with
brief descriptions of the recent history to place the research into context.
Background
The historical development of this conflict is beyond the scope of this article. We men-
tion, albeit briefly, the political agitations between Somalia and Kenya (Castagno 1964).
The Somali pre-independence agitation inspired the politics of ‘Greater Somalia’ (Lewis
2000, p. 116). The inspiration of Greater Somalia might have been motivated by ‘un-
usually fortunate’ political factors, by which is implied the homogeneity of culture and
religion (Lewis 2004, pp. 290 to 291; Hess 1966, pp. 194 to 195). Regional political agi-
tation for Somali unity gathered momentum with the independence of Somalia in 1960.
Somalia's grand political plans for uniting all the Somali speakers in the Horn of Africa
is enshrined in the constitution and represented in her flag showing a five pointed
white star against a sky blue background. The five points represent the five regions in
the Horn of Africa that had been split by colonial borders: these included the Ethiopian
Ogaden, British Somaliland, the former Italian Somaliland, Djibouti and the Northern
Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya (Farer 1979). The Somali national philosophy was
well articulated by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (1968, p. 219), the Prime Minister of
the first Somali Republic who stated:
I personally believe that a people living in a country, conditioned to the same
elements, exposed to the same hazards, sharing the heritage of democratic traditions,
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unique way of life, must inevitably develop similar inhabitations and attitudes as well
as a common and unifying philosophical code of ethics and conventions.
The speech by the Somali president Mr. Aden Abdullah Osman at the inaugural
summit conference of Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa in May 1963 was
more to the point. He associated imperial boundaries with the political demise of the
Somali nomads:
History has shown that the most serious obstacle to African unity originates from
the artificial political boundaries which were imposed on large areas of the African
continent by colonialist powers. We have seen how traditionally integrated societies
were torn apart and how their land is cruelly partitioned [by international borders
which in the Somali case run] the entire length of the existing boundaries…cut across
the traditional pastures of our own nomadic population (Hoskyns 1969, p. 32).
These were the fundamental principles in the demand for secession by the Somali
populations. Yet both Somalia and the neighbouring countries understood the implica-
tions of secessionism differently. As McEwen (1971, p. 127) suggests ‘those who sup-
ported the secessionist opinion did so on the understanding that they would not be
required to move from their present day homes’. Kenya's official expression in the light
of the 1960s was that if the population wanted to separate, then they would be at lib-
erty to do so but without an inch of Kenyan soil being transferred to Somalia (Lewis
2000). The Somalia position might be seen from the perspective of the indivisibility of
pastures that ecologically and economically determine the very existence of nomads.
From the perspective of Kenya, the Somali Republic's policy was a pursuit of territorial
claims on her NFD frontier.
This frontier gained prominence in the regional politics when Somali pastoralists
resident in the northern area of Kenya expressed a desire for a union with Somalia. In
1960 at a public rally at Mandera in northern Kenya, the governor of Kenya made an
oblique statement alluding to the fact that the Kenyan Colonial Government was not in
a position to make any guarantees on cession of the province to Somalia ‘but would be
prepared to assist in the achievement of this object once independence in Kenya was a
reality’. The official report added that ‘no amount of explanation can now destroy their
fond hope that union with Somalia is theirs for the asking’.3
During his visit to Mogadishu in 1960, Jomo Kenyatta, the future President of Kenya
and leader of the Kenya African National Union and the delegates of the Kenya African
Democratic Union, informed the Somali Republic's Prime Minister that the problem of
NFD was an ‘internal affair in which Somalia was not to interfere’. The Somali Prime
Minister responded by stating ‘if the phrase “interference in domestic affairs”’ was used,
then ‘any external opposition to Somali reunification is considered as interference in
the domestic affairs of the Somali people’ (Touval 1972, pp. 213/214). This reprove
against the views of the Kenyan delegation was a sign of deteriorating political relation-
ship over the issue of secession.
This did not however stop the colonial government in Kenya from lifting the
proscription of the political opposition4 (Turton 1972) which increased the political
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Somaliland and Somalia in 1960. The political situation was such that the majority of
Somalis in the NFD strongly supported self-determination with the option of uniting
with the Somali Republic (Egal 1968). Additionally, in sallying for preparation for the
registration of voters for the 1961 general election in Kenya, the Secretary of State for
Colonial Affairs, Mr. Reginald Maudling, announced at the 1960 Lancaster House Con-
ference that the views of the NFD residents would be sought on the thorny issue of se-
cession (The Earl of Lytton 1966) against the strong anti-secessionist views of the
Kenyan nationalist parties (Drysdale 1964).
The British administration, as promised earlier, called for constitutional arrangements
in which different residents of the NFD would present their views. As would be
expected, when the population was informed that they were to participate in the pre-
Kenyan independence elections, the residents of the NFD (the majority of whom were
Somalis) responded violently, displaying their disapproval and showing instead their de-
sire to be united with the newly independent Somali Republic (Turton 1972). Cam-
paigns for self-determination were conducted locally, and delegates were sent to
Somalia in 1961 to ask for political and economic support to achieve their objectives
‘by all possible means’ (Lewis 2000, p. 186).
The Somali National Parliament ‘passed a motion supporting the union of [NFD]
with the Republic and urging the Government to press for self-determination for its
people’ (Lewis 1963, p. 58). Similarly, the Somali party delegates at the Lancaster Con-
ference in 1961 announced that they would boycott the forthcoming general election in
opposition to the pro-independence Kenyan parties. The views of the Kenyan delegates
were strongly expressed by Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya who ‘felt that the people of
NFD…could not be expected to express a valid opinion until they had an opportunity
of fulfilling a more positive role in Kenya's future and expressing the benefits [they
would enjoy under] national government’ (Drysdale 1964, p. 108). These untenable po-
sitions resulted in the Colonial Secretary, Reginald Maudling, proposing a plebiscite ‘to
ascertain, and report on, public opinion in [NFD]’ (Touval 1972, p. 183). The NFD
Commission led by three prominent persons was assembled to conduct the plebiscite
in the six districts (Mburu 2005).
The Commission completed its findings by December 1962, exactly a year before
Kenya's independence.5 The Commission arrived at three general conclusions: First,
there was a fairly large pro-secessionist population that wished to detach itself from
Kenya. Second, there was a pro-Kenya group that had been suspicious of the calls for
union with the Somali Republic. Though lacking unity on the matter, the Borana
Oromo (the Waso Borana supported the secession) had historical reasons for rejecting
the Somali struggle for secession (Baxter 1966). The Rendille and El Molo that sup-
ported secessionism had no relationship with the Somalis culturally and historically.
The results of the plebiscite were thus divided, forcing the Kenyan Colonial administra-
tion to announce in Nairobi the decision for internal self-government within existing
boundaries (Mburu 2005). The rejection of secessionism sent shockwaves of political
dissent throughout the NFD (The Earl of Lytton 1966).
As anticipated, the outcome was a ruckus by the armed insurgency of the NFPLF
against Kenya's security forces and pro-independent pastoral populations.6 The out-
break of the war was followed by the looting of livestock, attacks on government
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assassinations of the Senior Chief (Haji Galma Dido) and the first African District
Commissioner (Mr. Daudi Wabera) by the agents of secession in 1963 (Pieter 1964)
were immediately followed by a declaration of a state of emergency throughout the
NFD that ‘entails the declaration of a five mile wide prohibited zone along the whole of
the Kenyan side of the frontier with Somalia’ to stop the shifta trained in Somalia from
infiltrating across into Kenya (Hoskyns 1969, p. 43).
The outbreak of shifta insurgency from 1963 through to 1967 disrupted life in the
NFD, with the brunt of the war affecting the pastoral economy. With the Kenyan
leaders expecting a full-scale insurgency, the country's security forces were put on high
alert to conduct counter-insurgency (Touval 1972). The security forces considered the
whole of the NFD to be an operational area (Mburu 2005). With considerable supplies
of military hardware and training being provided by Somalia, the shifta created wide-
spread terror. The government's response to the shifta pressure was to move the pasto-
ralists in the affected areas into ‘security villages’. The security clump down was spread
in the six districts of NFD (Whittaker 2012). Our focus is on the Isiolo District.
This is the period which the Waso Borana refer to as gaafa dhaabaa (‘the period of
stop’). They applied the term dhaabaa to describe the ‘the stop’ of pastoral production
and of human liberty. The use of the word dhaabaa implies a break from a past that
had been characterised by plentiful pastoral production (gaafa quufa) and by the con-
tinuous increase of livestock herds (gaafa hoormaata) to when the pastoral economy
had in effect collapsed (gaafa qoolooma) - the period of destitution. By 1966, pastoral-
ists were forced to move to the security villages, mainly in Garbatula, Merti and
Madogashe (Figure 1), and their livestock was restricted to a 5-km radius of the camps.
Any livestock or people found outside these areas were shot on sight by the police and
the military. An estimated 20,000 people and thousands of head of livestock were
forced into security settlements (Dahl and Sandford 1978) as a collective punishment
and a reaction to the casualties suffered by the Kenyan army to the land mines buried
by the insurgency.
Within a short period of time, the economy of the formerly wealthy pastoral popula-
tion had been shattered. The shifta period had three main consequences: First, the col-
lapse shifted the population from rural areas to local trading centres (Hogg 1980).
second, the residual herds had substantially lowered reproductive capacity (Hjort 1979).
and third, the impoverished population had become dependent on external food aid
and in need of rehabilitation (Hogg 1980, 1985). However, two outcomes, nearly forty
years after that war, have not been clearly understood: the status of the pastoral econ-
omy and the impacts of sustained banditry.
Study area
We selected communities living in Kinna, Kulamawe and Merti (Figure 1). The Kinna
area serves as a drought reserve for the Waso pastoral production. After the shifta war,
the area attracted increased numbers of destitute people from the security settlements.
These people had lost all their livestock and were settled on irrigation schemes run by
the government and the National Christian Council of Kenya (Hogg 1986). Some of the
destitute from Kinna also became internally displaced, forcing them to seek jobs on
farms in the neighbouring district of Meru. The community of Kulamawe was
Figure 1 The locations of the three communities in Isiolo District in northern Kenya.
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munity formed part of the Uaso Nyiro River floodplain production system. We
conducted a series of interviews in the three communities.
Methodology
Key informants were selected, mainly elders who were over 60 and older, and in-depth
interviews were carried out with 12 key informants from Merti, 15 from Kinna and 10
from Kulamawe. The key informants were knowledgeable about the history of the
Waso pastoral production system and had personal experience of the shifta war. Some
of the elders selected had participated in the insurgency. Other informants included
local security committee agents as well as government security personnel, pastoralists
who had fled to Somalia and those who had remained in the security camps. These key
informants provided detailed descriptions of Waso pre-shifta pastoral production in
terms of the main livelihood strategies of the people. We analysed their narratives on
perceptions of the impact of the shifta war on the pastoral economy. We supplemented
their information with government sources and newspaper articles.
Additionally, to understand the long-term impact of the shifta war on household live-
stock holdings, a total of 300 households (60 households from Merti, 120 from
Khalif and Oba Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2013, 3:14 Page 7 of 20
http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/3/1/14Kulamawe and 120 from Kinna) were interviewed using a structured questionnaire.
They answered questions such as the following: What was the impact of the shifta war on
the people? How was livestock production affected by war? Which livestock was most af-
fected? Further, 32 households from Merti, 58 from Kulamawe and 40 from Kinna were
interviewed in detail. The informants were asked to report on the estimated numbers by
livestock species owned by the family just before the start of the shifta war and at the end
of the dhaabaa period in 1968. With the help of the selected family members, the house-
holds' livestock holdings for selected years from 1984 to 2007 were reconstructed (here,
the family used herd life histories). The selected years were memorable: they were either
periods of droughts or heavy rainfall. The aim was to assess the increase in animal num-
bers, as this might indicate a pastoral recovery since the collapse (i.e. since 1968).
It should however be noted that such recall data are subject to error as a result of
memory loss. To minimise this, we interviewed the household heads in the company of
their family members so that their memories could be refreshed. The households were
asked to report on what they considered to be the major factors that impeded herd
growth after the shifta period. In analysing the collapse of the pastoral economy, we
calculated the mean estimated livestock holdings for the selected households just before
the shifta war, and again in 1968 (at the end of the war), and then calculated the per-
centage change in terms of the remaining herds in the subsequent years (Figure 2). The
term ‘recovery’7 implies that the livestock economy had regenerated to the pre-shifta
levels, or, given the magnitude of loss, that the livestock economy had stabilised in
comparison with the pre-shifta period. Recovery might also imply herd sizes greater
than the residual herds at the end of the conflict in 1968. We made the following addi-
tional assumptions regarding livestock recovery: (1) We did not attempt to distinguish
the sources of the livestock. (2) We accepted that the total livestock population, com-
prising different species (i.e. cattle, camels and small stock) per household during the
selected periods, irrespective, represented ‘herd recovery’ or lack of. (3) The extent of
recovery was site-specific.Results and discussion
Communities' perceptions of the pre-shifta pastoral economy
The shifta war had major ramifications for the lives and livelihoods of the Waso pasto-
ralists. In the pre-shifta period, the Waso Borana were among the wealthiest pastoral
groups in northern Kenya (Baxter 1954). The Waso ecosystem and its pastoral econ-
omy were described as follows by a local elder:
Before shifta came to our land, Waso was a land of plenty (lafa quufa)…we had lots
of cattle and goats…we were wealthy (nuu dureyii). We also had plenty of meat and
milk and people loved each other [too].8
The term quufa describes a state of pastoral wealth and a sense of personal satisfac-
tion. This evaluation was supported by another elder:
In the pre-shifta period…a person with 200 goats or 100 cattle was considered
poor…and we had no problems. We were self-sufficient like the [the British]…and
we used our land freely….9
Figure 2 Pre-shifta and post-shifta number of cattle (a), number of small stocks (b) and number of
camels (c).
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society in a number of ways: (1) The community owned large herds of livestock with
an abundance of livestock products; this demonstrated high productivity of the pastoral
economy. (2) The Waso Borana could migrate with their herds within a large expanse
of productive rangeland. The vast grazing areas that were available to them were
characterised by important ecological variations, making some grazing areas more suit-
able for particular types of livestock.
The sampled households confirmed that in the pre-shifta period the Waso Borana were
wealthy pastoralists. Even at the time, it is worth noting that the flocks of small stock were
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per household in Merti, 239 in Kulamawe and 198 in Kinna (Figure 2). The cattle holdings
were also substantial: In Merti, there was a mean of 174 heads of cattle per household; the
smallest herds were found in Kinna, where there were 126 heads per household. In the
pre-shifta period, it seems that the camel population was relatively small. The households
with the largest camel herds were from Kulamawe, with a mean of 40 animals; those with
fewest camels were from Kinna, with a mean of about 11 animals per household. We can
thus deduce from the recalled livestock holdings in the pre-shifta period that all three
communities had the benefit of a strong pastoral economy.
Baxter (1954) reports that the Waso pastoralists recall moments of prosperity when a
few individuals ‘even became too foolish’ and forgot that living in a risky environment
required personal moderation.10 Like other pastoralists in the NFD, the Waso Borana
had to deal with a highly variable environment, characterised by a ‘boom’ in production
during wet years, when there was a surplus of pastoral products, and a ‘slump’ during
drought years, when production declined. A common view among the herd owners we
interviewed was that in the pre-shifta period, the gap between the rich and the poor
was minimal because of the high livestock holdings per household that created self-
sufficiency. However, this state of pastoral well-being changed during and after the
shifta war. We interrogated the communities' perceptions.Communities’ perceptions of the impact of the shifta war
The Waso Borana suffered the brunt of the onslaught from the insurgency and the
Kenyan security's counter-insurgency (Hogg 1980). When the war intensified, the Somali
clansmen were able to cross into Somalia with their livestock, while most of the Waso
Borana did not have such an opportunity (Hjort 1979). People were arrested and many
died as a result of the extra-judicial killings (under the guise of fighting the shifta). The
following is one of the narratives by a survivor who lived to tell the story:
The military selected around 70 men from the security camps in Garbatula. We were
told we were being taken to Isiolo town to be interrogated on the shifta activities in
the area. While we were half way in our journey, in a place called Toiboto, the
vehicle was stopped and the military personnel started shooting at us
indiscriminately. Some of us who survived jumped out of the vehicle and ran into
the nearby bush. Many were not as lucky and at least 47 men were killed that day.
The following day there was broadcast on the national radio that shifta were killed
by the military…and yet we were innocent civilians.11
In Merti, a key informant also reported how some people lost all their family members:
Jirmo Katelo fled to Somalia during the shifta period. While he was away, all
members of his family were killed by the military in a day. The total numbers of
family members killed were 18; including his wife, children, brothers and his elderly
parents. He was the only survivor….12
The security forces used the excessive powers conferred on them to deal with shifta
combatants and innocent civilians. The deaths of many people and the systematic
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from Merti summarised the community's perception of the shifta war as follows: ‘…we
perished and so did our livestock’.13 The livestock losses were caused by a combination
of factors: raids by shifta, confiscation by government officials and animal deaths from
starvation (Dahl 1979; Whittaker 2012). For example, the shifta raided and took 600
cattle and 130 camels belonging to Boru Bonsaa's family.14 Moreover, a large number
of livestock and people were said to have died due to indiscriminate bombardment by
the military. For example:
Kanchoro Kormayu's family owned 175 cattle and 75 camels when they were put in
the security camp in Garbatula. The military machine-gunned the herd and killed his
younger brother. They came out of dhaabaa without a single livestock head.15
Further, similar cases were described:
The family of Sora Galma Roba had 600 cattle and 400 goats when they were put in
the security camp. During the…war their livestock was machine-gunned by the
military and as result his two uncles and a cousin died. By the end of shifta war the
family remained with only 5 cattle and 30 goats.16
Moreover:
The family of Jillo Hassano had 60 camels and on one fateful day, the military
machine-gunned the herd and killed all the animals together with the two herders.17
One elder said, ‘the numbers of livestock confiscated by government, machine-
gunned by the army and those that died out of starvation are almost equal’.18 Another
elder stated:
…I bear witness that for sure our livestock were taken away from the camps to Isiolo
and other towns in Kenya by the military and the police…I have been part of the
government security committee and I have witnessed it…our livestock were finished
by the government. On one occasion 37 karra [A karra is an enclosure that can
accommodate 100 livestock and therefore 37 karra is equivalent to 3,700 animals] of
mainly cattle and small stock were taken away by the military.19
Apart from the official government confiscation, the security personnel were also ac-
cused of extorting livestock for personal benefit. A former member of the security com-
mittee said:
…we were expected to bribe them so that they would tell us when the military would
come and do bombing…so each day we were told to provide them with one bull [for
slaughter]…we lost many livestock also because of these daily bribes.20
The atrocities towards the civilians and their livestock and property had been
reported in the media and in some cases in the official reports. While many of the offi-
cial documents on the insurgency period have not been opened for public viewing,
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been committed by the state agents. This can be gleaned from the reports of the media
and the government at the time.The media and the government reports on the shifta war
By 1964, the intensity of the conflict was heightened with the insurgency attacking gov-
ernment stations and towns and also preying on local communities. The government
could not contain these attacks, and as a result, the residents were terrorised by both
the shifta and the army. The national newspapers reported a series of violent incidents
in the NFD. For example, the Daily Nation, on Wednesday, 18 November 1964, carried
the following report:
Thirty-two shifta are known to be dead and about 40 wounded following a five-hour
battle with Kenya security forces at the weekend. The battle took place in Merti…
[when] the army and police intercepted a shifta gang of 250 deep in the gully….21
There were reports on intensified attacks by the shifta on businesses of the local resi-
dents of Waso. For example, the Daily Nation, on Monday, 24 December 1964,
reported that:
A gang of 12 to 20 shifta is believed to have attacked a shop owned by Mr. Guyo
Shano and stole goods valued at £52-105.22
The newspapers also communicated government propaganda against the shifta. In
some cases, the so-called shifta reported as killed were in fact members of the public,
who were alleged to have supported the shifta. The Daily Nation, on Thursday, 20
April 1965, observes:
Kenya's security forces in the north-eastern region have been given orders to shoot
anyone in the area suspected to be a shifta.23
A telegram sent by the administration from Garbatula states:
It has been found out that some disloyal citizens still communicate with shifta and
they have been buying food stuff and take to shifta in the bush (sic). In view of this
the sub-district security committee is of the opinion that an order from Province be
sought so as to give power to security forces to convict anybody found with the food
stuff…outside trading centres.24
In the circumstance, the distinction between shifta combatants and the local citizens
was blurred. Local people were targeted by the army on any flimsy grounds. It was
common for the government security forces to demand more powers, including powers
of arbitrary arrest and the confiscation of property, all under the justification of increas-
ing security problems. In one such incident, the sub-district security staff of Garbatula
requested permission to seize the pastoralists' livestock, and this was granted by a legal
notice. The notice, communicated telegraphically to the Regional Government Agent in
Isiolo, states, ‘The sub-district Security Committee is of the opinion that the District
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tion] to enable the government to recover time and money already wasted’.25 Indeed,
the order was calling for the government agents to use the excuse of anti-shifta activ-
ities to loot livestock from the people. The normal movement of livestock and people
was restricted by the government through a Public Order Act. The Order includes de-
tails of the curfew imposed:
In exercise of the powers conferred by section 8 (1) of the Public Order Act, the
Provincial Police Officer for the Eastern Province by this order directs that within
the areas described by the schedule to this order and during the hours between 6.30
p.m. and in the afternoon and 6.30 a.m. of the following morning, every person shall
except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a written permit
granted by a police officer…remain indoors.26
There were three main objectives of this draconian order by the police: (1) to reduce
any potential contact between the civilians and the shifta, (2) to break the morale of
the hard-core shifta members so that they would surrender to the security forces and
(3) to completely transform the lifestyle of the nomads from one of mobility to
sedentarization. The government was aware that these changes would have an adverse
impact on the pastoral economy. In one of the government reports on the shifta activ-
ities, the following observations were made in relation to these aims:
The year has seen an intensive effort by the Provincial Administration to complete
the manyatazation [villagisation] plans throughout the Province, and by October
1966, the majority of the people were accommodated in villages. This concentration
of the people and consequential tighter control of grazing areas no doubt had its
effect on the morale of the shifta, as they were further removed from contact with
their friends and relatives in the villages.27
The District Annual Report of 1967 added that ‘many animals died as a result of con-
centration in and around the [security villages], and as was expected, famine came
through the backdoor’.28 It is clear that the famine was not the result of natural causes
but was induced by the deliberate policy of exclusion and restriction of the supply of
food in the region. For the pastoralists, the death of their livestock removed their access
to food. The report further added, ‘[a]s a result of the intensified anti-shifta campaign,
many Somalis, Borana and others in Isiolo District…ran away from the area…The
population of the district dropped considerably and trade was very much affected’.29
In response to the shifta activities, the government established a Special Operations
Committee stationed in Isiolo to coordinate all operations in shifta areas. Unofficial
sources we interviewed confirmed that the operation afforded the army a free hand to deal
with not only the shifta, but also with civilians.30 The impact of these actions on the live-
stock economy was dire. According to the Annual Report of the Garrissa District of 1968:
…People who were known to have involved themselves in shifta activities had their
property including cattle and all seized…and was confiscated and sold by public
auction…So, in 1968 the cattle population, and particularly shoats [i.e. sheep and
goats] had decreased considerably.31
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army operations and were completely silent on the number of livestock looted or
destroyed by the military. Instead, government statistics of 1963/1965 to 1967 reported
that a total of 28,500 head of livestock had been stolen by the shifta, with less than 12%
recovered. A report in the daily newspaper, The Standard, on the main impact of the
shifta and the army during the 1960s and 1970s summarises the situation at the time:
‘…survivors of the drought and the war were left very poor. Many women [were]
widowed, children orphaned and whole families separated’.32 The overall picture is that
the livestock economy was severely affected by the war. The confiscation of livestock
was a deliberate move by the government to punish the Waso Borana in response to
the army's high casualties caused by land mines laid by the insurgency. A government
report added:
The month saw increased shifta activities and introduction of landmines, which
resulted in over 490 head of cattle being confiscated and more destroyed by security
forces, as a punishment to the hostile tribesmen.33
The District Commissioner (R.K. Musyoki), Isiolo, ordered as follows:
That 10% of the stock seized from the Kubi Turkana Manyatta be confiscated.
All seized stock belonging to persons who assisted shifta personally during the
period of 18th to 20th March 1965 to be confiscated. All seized stock belonging
to the shifta leader Mohamed Awl and any other shifta to be confiscated. All
the proceeds of the sale of such confiscated stock to be paid into the SD. (A)
Act Fund.34
As the war gradually came to an end and peace was declared between Somalia and
Kenya35, the local pastoralists were informed that they could claim compensation for
the livestock destroyed or stolen. Though we found no evidence in the archives that
the victims were compensated, there are detailed correspondences where the com-
plaints by the pastoralists were filed. This material would be reported elsewhere, suffice
to summarise some key incidents. More than 150 herders presented claims to the gov-
ernment. The Borana herd owner Boru Soraa was one of those who presented such
claims to the District Commissioner, Isiolo. His letter states, ‘This is to inform you that
in 1965 my 110 head of cattle were taken away by government due to the problem of
shifta, I am asking for compensation’.36 Mr. Halake Guyo reported that on 9 November
1966 the security forces confiscated 400 cattle at Moliti (Kulamawe). Some claims were
submitted by women. For example, Asha Warsame Farah (a Somali) claimed that 200
sheep and goats, 1,100 cattle and 30 donkeys belonging to her had been taken by the
government security staff in 1967. The correspondences also claim a large loss of prop-
erty in terms of destruction of houses. A group of 205 families sent their claims to the
District Commissioner, reporting the loss of a total of 17,436 cattle, while eight families
reported the loss of 2,474 sheep and goats, 30 camels and 197 donkeys, and the de-
structions of businesses.37 The outcome of the insurgency and the government
counter-insurgency was severe on the pastoral economy, the effects of which is still be-
ing felt some 44 years after the war ended.
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By the end of the shifta war, two species of livestock had almost disappeared: these
were small stock and the camels (Dahl 1979). Hogg (1985) estimates that between 1963
and 1970, the camel population declined by 95% and the small stock population by
90%. The camel population declined sharply, partly because the Sakuye camel keepers
fled to Somalia with their herds. However, the camel herds perished as a result of tsetse
fly effects that caused huge mortalities. Their herds of small stock were decimated be-
cause they were frequently slaughtered to provide food for starving families and eaten
by the security forces. One elder summarised the status of the small stock herds and
camel population by the end of the shifta war:
At the end of dhaabaa the sight of small stock became a rarity and was a sort of
amusement and attracted a lot of attention. People would shout across the villages
and tell each other ‘come out and see some goats’ as if they had never seen it before
or as if it were some kind of a new creature that had come into existence. For sure,
this species almost disappeared.38
The elders interviewed reported that nearly all the Waso pastoral families had been ren-
dered stockless within a very short period of time. Our household data confirm the col-
lapse of the livestock population and pastoral economy in the aftermath of the shifta
insurgency (1968) across all three communities. Camels were the species most affected by
the conflict. At the end of insurgency in 1968, the mean camel holding of Kulamawe was
7.2 animals per household, and they registered the highest loss, of 97.5%. The mean camel
holding in Merti was 11.5 animals, showing a decline of 93%. Kinna had a mean of 25
camels per household, registering a decline of 80.2%. The small stock holdings showed a de-
cline across the three sites averaging 92.3%, while the cattle population declined by 89.6%.
The livestock populations during the selected years (1984 to 2007) never reached the
levels of the pre-shifta period (Figure 2a,b,c). The pastoral economy has persisted at
lower population levels and showed a minor recovery at a rate of about 0.4% per year.
The comparisons of the herds by species and by site showed some variation, but over-
all, there was no recovery, which the communities blamed on persistent banditry since
the shifta war and frequent droughts.Impact of banditry and recurrent droughts on pastoral economy
The proliferation of small arms had transformed the conflict from a regional war to
local banditry after the emergence of Somali bandits involved in organised poaching,
mainly elephants for their ivory (Daleo 1979). This caused high levels of local insecurity
in the Waso region. The economic agendas of the poachers are central to continuation
of armed conflicts fuelled by increase in the supply of small arms (Collier and Hoeffler
2004). Banditry on the highway, night attacks on households or businesses and attacks
on ordinary travellers disrupted the recovery. One resident of Kulamawe reported the
following event that happened after the end of shifta war:
…If they spot businessmen they kill them and loot the goods they are transporting.
This is how the Waso Borana lost all their prominent businessmen. I can count up
to 20 businessmen killed by bandits.39
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rated the following incident:
…shifta tied together 15–20 men and beat them to death…. Some of my friends were
tied together and burnt to death.40
A resident of Rapsu village in Kinna narrated a harrowing experience:
One day we were walking from Rapsu irrigation scheme to Kinna. Half way through
the journey some armed Somali men stopped us. We were five men, two women and
a girl of 12 years. They pointed guns at our heads and tied all the men together.
They told us to watch as they raped the women and the little girl. We felt very
helpless, we wanted to die….41
These narratives show unforgettable ‘social and economic wounds’ left in the Kinna
community. It is a story where the problem was partly exacerbated by the weakness of
state surveillance in remote areas, which prevented the eradication of banditry. For the
Waso Borana, the insurgency and counter-insurgency were the root causes of pastoral
poverty. An elder from Kinna reported:
Our problem is rooted in insecurity. I can confidently say that our current poverty is
caused by insecurity. If you ask all the households in Kinna today, you will not get a
single family that has not lost their livestock or a member of their family to cattle
raiders and highway bandits.42
Banditry continued into the early 1990s. According to another elder from Kulamawe:
On 19th May 1992 the Somali bandits attacked our village in Kulamawe and made
away with a total of 400 cattle. My family lost 80 cattle and my brother's leg was
amputated due to the bullet wounds received during the attack.43
Another elder from Merti said:
Since the end of shifta war it is over 40 years and the killings continue. Recently,
they raided our family's herd and injured my brother. Even this elder sitting next to
you lost all his livestock to Somali bandits.44
Our informants reported strong links between sustained banditry and poverty. This is
what one other elder said:
Three things have refused to leave us: hunger, poverty and war. It is impossible for
us to recover from poverty because, for example, a person who was rich yesterday
becomes stockless overnight due to the cattle raid…. If this is our everyday life, how
[does one] expect us to come out of poverty?45
These narratives reflect desperation and vulnerability of the community suffering
from sustained conflicts. The sustained insecurity and frequent droughts would explain
the rather low level of pastoral herd recovery after the shifta war.
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(Dahl 1979; Hogg 1990; Baxter 2001). These areas were prone to overstocking,
increasing the vulnerability of herds to recurrent droughts. According to a group
discussion:
The Somalis have made 100 km stretch of land that borders their territories unsafe
for us and our livestock. Our livestock cannot graze more than 5 kilometres from
the town. If we attempt to graze further than this our livestock will not return and
that is also the end of the herders' lives….
Even when peace returned, the Somali herds encroached on pastures traditionally re-
served for the dry season. The effect is massive livestock losses during drought periods.
During the drought of 1984, locally referred to as oolaa Katitinii (the drought year
when herds moved to Katitini in Kitui District), there were massive losses of livestock.
The most recent drought was that of 2005 to 2006, locally referred to as oolaa
hammeena (the drought that brought diseases). The key informants reported several
cases where households lost nearly all their livestock. A resident of Kulamawe, Mr. Wario
Jaldesa, reported the following about the 2006 drought:
At the onset of the drought period, I moved my livestock from Kulamawe to Galana
(in Merti). I had 500 head of cattle and most of them perished there. The main cause
of the deaths was the spread of sombeesa [bovine pleuro-pneumonia]…. I am not the
only one who suffered the losses, many people in Waso suffered like me.
Another factor that undermines herd growth is that pastoralists are increasingly set-
tling down as a result of the need to access social amenities such as schools. Some of
the settled groups keep livestock near their homesteads, with the livestock grazing only
a few kilometres from the settlement. This is partly contributed by loss of labour force
for herding. The withdrawing of child labour from herding to formal education means
that herders must now rely on hired labour. The herders argued that hired labourers
do not have the same commitment to the livestock as the owners have. The loss of
commitment and adequate pastoral labour is considered by the three communities to
be an additional cause of the lack of recovery.Conclusions
In this article, we have dealt with the impact of post-independence armed insurgency,
counter-insurgency and the post-shifta banditry on the pastoral economy of the Waso
Borana. This study had examined one aspect of the impact: the pastoral production.
The shifta insurgency and the Kenyan army's counter-insurgency had left legacies of
socio-economic and personal traumas in the minds of some of the residents of the
former NFD. This is a subject matter that in the official circles was hushed until the
1990s. The time is now ripe to conduct a post-mortem analysis of the insurgency war
and its local and regional implications, particularly its transforming effects on the pas-
toralist livelihood strategies. We have shown that the contemporary conflicts in Waso
are a continuation of past armed conflicts coupled with droughts. This situation is illus-
trated by two features of the conflicts. First, although the shifta activities were driven in
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the Horn of Africa resulting from political instability. Second, the extension of armed
insurgency and counter-insurgency on the pastoral economy has led to the proliferation
of small arms in the region. The shifta war provides an important historical benchmark
for understanding the politics as well as legacies of poverty and insecurity that have
locked the region into continued instability for 44 years after the main conflict had
waned. Our study has merely scratched the surface of the long-term consequences of
the post-independence insurgencies and counter-insurgency on the pastoral economy
in northern Kenya, a subject which no doubt deserves more comprehensive analysis by
historians and anthropologists in the future.
Endnotes
1The six districts (comprising Isiolo, Marsabit, Moyale, Wajir, Garissa and
Mandera) were administered separately from the rest of the country between 1909
and 1963. They were ‘closed’ from the rest of the country through district ordinances
that obliged travellers to carry ‘passes’ when travelling both within and outside the
region (see Mburu 2005). The NFD shared international borders with Somalia and
Ethiopia.
2The word ‘shifta’ (bandits) was the official term used by the Kenyan Government for
the secessionist insurgency of the time. The term, probably derived from Amharic, is
an old expression used when referring to general types of outlaws.
3Walters PE to Small AC. 1949. Handing over report: Garissa District, KNA/DC/
GRA/2/2.
4Immediately, the ban on political parties was lifted and new political parties were
formed, the majority of whom championed the union with Somalia. These included the
pro-secessionist Northern Province People's Progressive Party, the Northern Province
People's National Union and the anti-secessionist parties of the Galla Political Union
and Northern Peoples United Association.
5 Kenya gained independence on 12 December 1963.
6The Marsabit and Moyale Borana Oromo and Gabbra were among the pro-
independence pastoral groups.
7It was clearly not practical to try and find the exact source of livestock acquisition
over such a long period. It was possible that some of the stock reported could have
been raided from other communities, in which case the new owners would be unlikely
to reveal their sources. Because of the uncertainty, our data is not ideal for modelling
herd growth with assumed rates of births, deaths and offtake (see Dahl and Hjort 1976;
Oba 2001 for the assumptions made in such models).
8Interview with Huqa Wario in Kulamawe, 30 September 2007.
9Interview with Mohamed Koricha in Merti, 2 November 2007.
10Paul Baxter (1954, p. 136) cites such an illuminating moment, which has remained
a popular story, about one foolish pastoralist. A wealthy young Moslem Borana named
Hapi Bonaya made unacceptable jibes against nature. In 1949, during a brief dry season,
he and others experienced milk shortages from the herds. This was followed by another
period of deluge, hence his curious ‘jibes’ regarding the surplus milk for which they had
no immediate use. Hapi, who fancied himself as a comic (as Baxter explains), took a full
container of milk and staged the following scene, with Hapi playing both parts of the
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Milk: ‘In the stomach of God’. Hapi: ‘Return to God then’, with which remark, Hapi
kicked over [the milk container] and beat the milk with a stick while it drained into the
sand. The story had a sad ending. Hapi soon after became a perpetual poor.
11Interview with Godana Waqo in Kulamawe in August 2007.
12Interview with Sama Halakhe in Kinna on 1 August 2007.
13Interview with Jattani Duba in Marti in 2007.
14Interview with Mohamed Koricha Merti August 2007.
15Interview with Mohamed Koricha Merti August 2007.
16Interview with Mohamed Koricha Merti August 2007.
17Group discussion in Merti in September 2007.
18Group discussion in Merti in September 2007
19Group discussion in Merti in September 2007.
20Group discussion in Merti in September 2007.
21The Daily Nation, Wednesday 18 November 1964
22The Daily Nation, Monday 24 December 1964
23The Daily Nation, Thursday 20 April 1965
24Telegram, G/Tula EN 24/13 of 1966.
25Telegram EN 24/12 S. 225/66, Legal Notice no. 263 (Para 13 2 B) on stock seizer.
26Public Order Act (Cap. 56) Laws of Kenya 1962 (Revised). Curfew orders signed by
HM Ochieng, Provincial Police Officer, Eastern Province.
27Operations against shifta: An appreciation of statistics the fourth year, BB/12/26,
vol. 1 1.11.66 to 31.10.67.
28Isiolo District Annual Report 1967, RU P/P/1.
29Annual Confidential Report 1967: Isiolo District.
30Interview with an ex-army official who participated in the operations against
the shifta.
31Garissa District Annual Report 1968, RE/8/22.
32Letter from DC Isiolo, 10 March 1967 to PC Eastern referenced ADM 15/18/20.
33Extract of the order dated 24 March 1965.
34The peace was negotiated by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia dubbed the
Arusha Declaration at a seating in the Tanzanian town of Arush. The peace negotia-
tions were attended by the Kenyan and the Somali delegates.
35Compensation claims for livestock and properties lost during the shifta menace,
KNA/DC/ISO/4/7/4.
36Compensation claims for livestock and properties lost during the shifta menace,
KNA/DC/ISO/4/7/4.
37Group discussion in Kulamawe August 2007.
38Interview with Sama Halakhe in Kinna on 1 August 2007.
39Group discussion in Kulamawe August 2007.
40Interview with Sama Halakhe in Kinna on 1 August 2007.
41Group discussion in Kinna on 1 August 2007.
42 Group discussion in Kinna on 1 August 2007.
43Interview with Jilo Tacho in Kulamawe, 18 September 2007.
44Group discussion in Merti in September 2007.
45Group discussion in Merti in September 2007.
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